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literature, relates to the RJV’s ability to organize research more efficiently
than independent firms. The fact that RJVs can be both more profitable and
yield higher expected net welfare than independent firms is surprising
because it is derived from a model in which RJVs do not optimize over
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1 Introduction
The large amount of literature on Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) that has
accumulated in the last 20 years or so1 is based on the assumption that the
process whereby new useful ideas are discovered (the innovation process) can
be largely “black boxed” with no significant loss to the robustness of the
resulting analysis of the links between the research process and the formation,
organization, and performance of RJVs. This paper questions this underlying
assumption and suggests that even a basic understanding of the information
flows involved in the production of innovations can not only provide useful
insights into RJVs, but also add a new set of features to be taken into account
when assessing the desirability (or otherwise) of RJVs.
1 Recent surveys include Caloghirou et al. (2003), Sena (2004), Silipo (2003).
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Before peering into the black box of innovation, it may be useful to advance
a possible explanation as to why most models of collaborative research tend to
neglect the specific nature of process whereby new ideas are produced.
The theoretical literature on RJVs was initially developed as an application
of multi-stage games to the increasingly policy-relevant field of inter-firm colla-
boration in R&D. The emphasis was on the optimal allocation of resources to
R&D under alternative competitive/cooperative regimes in each of the strategic
stages of the game (typically, some combination of choice of R&D investment, of
R&D collaboration, and of output/price levels). The ultimate aim of the literature
has been to identify the mix of type of research collaboration and of competi-
tiveness in each stage of the game yielding the highest welfare. This modeling
strategy has been remarkably successful in so far as it has produced very helpful
insights on the delicate interplay of R&D investment, collaborative research, and
final-output market outcomes, without having to specify how the distinctive
features of research may affect the behavior of RJVs.
This paper considers the effects on RJVs of two defining characteristics of
research:
(i) the successful completion of almost any research project involves the over-
coming of more than one obstacle (the multi-task nature of research); and
(ii) typically there is more than one way to overcome any given research
obstacle (the multi-path nature of research).2
The paper attempts to show that the resulting marginally less coarse description of
the research process has first-order effects on the efficiency of RJVs.
The central idea of the paper is very simple and can be summarized as
follows. Consider a 2 × 2 × 2 world where an invention can be obtained only if two
research tasks (task A and task B) are completed successfully and where there
are two possible methods of accomplishing each task. Each of two firms decides
independently which method to try for each task. Therefore it is perfectly
conceivable that if firms choose different methods, one firm can succeed in
task A and fail in task B, whereas its rival fails in task A and succeeds in task
B. As a result, neither firm manages to produce the invention. Suppose now that
the two firms carry out exactly the same research plan, but form a RJV whereby
information about each task is shared. Obviously, by combining firm 1’s success-
ful method for task A with firm 2’s success in task B, the RJV achieves the overall
success that could not be obtained by each firm independently.
2 Obviously, neither of the above characteristics of the research process would matter if the
outcomes of projects were non-stochastic and thus in what follows it will be assumed that
success in research is uncertain.
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Before presenting the model, a warning must be issued to readers familiar
with the current literature on RJVs: the modeling strategy adopted in this paper
is a complete reversal compared to most existing models of RJVs. The latter
determine the efficiency of RJVs in terms of the volume of R&D investment (or
cost reduction/product improvement), whereas the present paper shows that
even for a fixed and sub-optimal level of R&D inputs, RJVs may yield a welfare
improvement relative to independent research. Indeed the paper biases the
analysis heavily against RJVs vis-à-vis independent research, by assuming that
independent firms do optimize over the volume of R&D investment, but RJVs do
not. In spite of this handicap, the paper highlights the existence of a hitherto
neglected but potentially large organizational surplus, i.e., an unambiguous
Pareto improvement that can be achieved by firms forming an RJV even though
their R&D investment is constrained to a sub-optimal level. In other words, in
this paper one of the major advantages of RJVs highlighted in the literature,
namely, that RJVs can avoid duplication of research efforts, is removed by
construction, thereby making the analysis biased against RJVs.
2 A simple model of multi-task research
projects
Although unfamiliar to most economists, the field of systems reliability3
provides a very useful analogy for the modeling of multi-task, multi-path,
non-deterministic research.
The diagram described in Figure 1, familiar to any electrical/electronic
engineer, shows a simple structure where each dot represents a “switch”, i.e.,
the most elementary example of a device that can either work or fail. In this
particular instance, the five switches are connected in such a way that the whole
structure can function (i.e., a connection from I to K can be established) even if
not all five switches work. Indeed there are four different ways in which this
structure can perform, namely, when any of the four “routes” {x1, x2}, {x4, x5},
{x1, x3, x5}, {x4, x3, x2} is working.
The very same structure can be interpreted in terms of a research problem,
whereby in order to achieve a “discovery”, i.e., to move from Ignorance to
3 The seminal paper in this area is “Probabilistic logics” (1956) where John von Neumann (who
else?) showed how to combine unreliable devices (the so-called “Sheffer stroke”) so that they
can function as a system of higher reliability.
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Knowledge, there is essentially a pair of two-obstacle search routes (namely
{x1, x2} and {x4, x5}) with an additional “bridging” route (x3).
4
The basic notion underlying this paper is that there exists a very close
relationship between the way the process of research is structured and the way
in which a multi-component system can be organized. With reference to the
research problem described in Figure 1, each “dot” represents a “research unit”
(laboratory, R&D personnel, etc.) assigned to a specific task. The structure of the
problem to be solved is fully captured by the way in which the research units are
connected and can be described as follows: there are two substantive research
obstacles to be overcome, each of which can be tackled in two different ways.
One obstacle can be surmounted by the successful accomplishment of either
task x1 or task x4, while the removal of the other obstacle requires the comple-
tion of either task x2 or task x5, with task x3 acting as a “translator”, i.e. making
the outcome of task x4 (respectively, x1) available to task x2 (respectively, x5).
This is hardly surprising: anyone engaged in research is only too painfully
aware that, typically, the attainment of any research goal involves the over-
coming of more than a single obstacle and that usually there is more than one
way of tackling any given obstacle.
As this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to model research
as a multi-component structure, I may be forgiven for concentrating on this
aspect of the innovation process, ignoring other important features of research,
e.g., its sequential nature.5 This implies that the order in which tasks are
x4
x3
x1
x2
x5
I K
Figure 1: A multi-component system – the “bridge” structure.
4 To mention an example familiar to the reader, suppose that the aim is to write a publishable
paper in mathematical economics where the first “obstacle” may be proving an existence
theorem (which can be established either by topological means (x1) or constructively)** (x4)
and the second obstacle may be proving a uniqueness theorem (which, again, can be done
topologically)** (x2) or constructively (x5), with (x3) being a way of translating a topological
story into a constructive argument.
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tackled is immaterial. In order words, the results examined in the paper
apply to any sort of modular6 research problem, defined as a problem
where the probabilities of success in each tasks are statistically and
temporally independent.
Three examples may suffice to suggest that modularity is a significant
feature of many innovation processes.
Baldwin and Clark (2000) have devoted an entire book to showing how
the major breakthrough in the efficient production of personal computers
came about with the decision by IBM in the early 1960s to produce the
System/360 in an explicitly modular fashion, setting up independent teams
working on separate problems thanks to an overall product architecture that
allowed product designers to combine individual components into an organic
whole with a minimum of inter-component “interference”.
Another example of planned modularity is provided by Rolls-Royce’s major
commercial success of the RB211 family of jet engines, whereby the traditional
two-shaft engine was replaced by a three-shaft model, which by splitting the
compression work across three independent compressors (one each for low-,
medium-, and high-compression) with their own turbines, not only has allowed
the RB211 family to improve engine performance dramatically, but also has
provided a design that can be adapted to individual customer needs much
more efficiently simply by tweaking the characteristics of individual
compressors.
A topical example of modularity is provided by the accelerated develop-
ment of an H1N1 vaccine (against “swine flu”), with the manufacturer being
reported as working simultaneously at researching new ways of increasing
the volume of production and at the proportion of active ingredients in the
vaccine.
5 As modelled, for example, in Weitzman (1979) and Weitzman and Roberts (1981).
6 My use if the term modular is related to, but different from, two standard uses: in mathema-
tical economics a function , which, for simplicity we can assume smooth, is modular if
for (see the classic treatment in Topkis (1998)). In management science, and
especially in product design, the notion of modularity is similar to Simon’s concept of decom-
posable systems, meaning the extent to which large complex problems can be broken down into
smaller sub-problems. The connection between the two concepts is that if the interactions
between variables/subsets are weak or non-existent, then the search for optimal solutions can
be achieved in a piece-meal fashion (see Brusoni et al. (2007) for an example and algorithm).
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3 Multi-task multi-path research by independent
firms
In order to separate the familiar analysis of the optimal allocation of research
resources from a novel approach to the optimal organization of research, first I
provide a very general formulation of the former, as follows.
In an industry populated by N independent firms (for my purposes it is
immaterial whether N is exogenously fixed or is determined by a free entry
condition) a typical firm i chooses its R&D effort xi so to solve the following
program:
, where [1]
= firm i’s gross profit function,
= firm i’s probability of system success
= firm i’s probability of component success
= firm i’s total cost of R&D
Notice that the above formulation allows for extensive information spillovers, in
so far as the vector x‒i enters both the probability of success function and the
total cost of R&D function.
Notice also that in a multi-task research process a distinction must be drawn
between system and component success, the former being the probability that all
research tasks are accomplished; the latter being the probability that a single
task is completed successfully.
Obviously in order for a meaningful comparison to be made between inde-
pendent research and a research joint venture, it must be assumed that the
former attains a stable unique equilibrium. For the remainder of this paper it is
assumed that , , , and are well behaved in the sense that the
program eq. [1] yields a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium whereby each
independent firm invests in R&D effort. To save on notation the following
shorthand is used: , i.e., henceforth the probability of component
success p refers to the Nash equilibrium value for N independent firms.
Having established the benchmark for the optimal allocation of R&D efforts
under independent research, we can address the issue of the optimal organiza-
tion of research.
In order to produce an invention, each firm has to solve T “research tasks”,
each of which can be solved through M distinct methods, , with
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probability of (component) success .7 For simplicity it is assumed that
, i.e., for a given amount of R&D investment all methods are
equally probable to succeed, but all the results in the paper apply also to
the non-symmetric case.8 To avoid uninteresting complications we assume that
the total number of potential methods is large enough that we can ignore the
case where more than one firm tries the same method for any given task and
therefore the number of methods that can be tried for any given task is given by
the number of firms N engaged in research.9 The simplest interpretation of this
stochastic process is when each firm follows a different research path.10 In this
simplest of models of multi-task research the Nash equilibrium value of per-firm
expected gross profits can be computed as follows:
[2]
It may be noted that the above is a very general formulation that encompasses
both tournament and non-tournament models of technological competition, to
use the distinction introduced by Dasgupta (1986).
In a tournament game, firms compete for a single prize πM (e.g., the
present value of the stream of monopoly profits generated by a single patent)
and, in the event of i firms succeeding (i > 1), each of the i successful firms has a
probability 1i of reaping monopoly profits. Thus in eq. [2] .
In a non-tournament game, the payoffs from successful innovation depend
on market structure in the following sense: if only one firm (j firms) succeeds
(succeed) at the research stage it (each) collects profits (gross of research costs)
; where πM is monopoly profits and αi is an index of market
competition.
7 Here superscripts refer to tasks, not to firms.
8 By making this symmetry assumption we are ignoring some interesting applications of the
“systems reliability” approach to research organization, in so far as the approach sketched here
yields some sharp implications on the optimal assignment of R&D resources when tasks are not
equally difficult to accomplish.
9 Notice that this assumption biases the analysis against RJVs in so far as an RJV would never
try the same method more than once and therefore could achieve a resource saving with no
decrease in the overall probability of success compared to independent firms following identical
methods.
10 As mentioned later, the model also applies to the case where only one method succeeds
(with certainty), but it is not distinguishable ex ante from the other M–1 useless methods, so
that ex ante PI = … = pM= 1M.
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In other words, in a non-tournament model, as there are multiple prizes and
therefore profits are dissipated through (imperfect) competition, the will
satisfy the following restrictions:
, [3]
i.e., gross industry profits must be decreasing in the number of active firms. For
example, in the textbook case of a linear Cournot oligopoly (i.e., when output-
setting firms operate under a linear demand curve with
constant marginal costs normalized to zero), it can be easily computed that:
etc.
4 Multi-task multi-path research by
organization-efficient RJVs
As the issue of the optimal organization of RJVs under multi-task, multi-path
research has not been addressed in the literature it may be useful to introduce
the concept of organizationally efficient RJV.
Recall that an invention can be produced only if all T tasks are completed,
with each task having M possible methods of accomplishing it. As with the case
of independent research, we assume w.l.o.g. that each firm can try only one
method for each task.
If N firms wish to pool their fixed resources to maximize the probability of
overall success, how should research be organized? The answer to this question
is found by comparing two dual organization structures:
(i) N teams are formed, with each team picking one possible method for each of
the T tasks and testing the resulting combined overall solution.11 The prob-
ability of system success, when each task has the same probability of
success p is easily computed as
(ii) T teams are formed (one per task), each team using N possible methods to
accomplish the assigned task.12 The probability of system success now is
given by .
11 In systems reliability terminology this is a parallel-series arrangement, whereby N series of T
components each are arranged in parallel.
12 This is a series-parallel arrangement whereby T arrangements of N components are each
arranged in series.
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Notice that the overall number of methods deployed to solve the overall
problem (i.e., NT) is the same for the two organization structures.
A key result in systems reliability theory states that:
Theorem 1 (after Ross(1996)):
For any , .
Proof: see Appendix.
Theorem 1 is crucial to the understanding of the built-in organizational efficiency
of RJVs: if an RJV can choose its organizational structure (as we assume here,
unlike most of the literature on RJVs), it will always select to duplicate effort for
each task, and not to replicate whole research teams (when each team attempts
to accomplish all tasks).
We are now in a position to compare independent research with an organi-
zationally efficient RJV.
For most of the analysis, attention will be restricted to the simple case of
industry-wide RJVs, namely where the only alternative to independent research
is for all firms in the industry to join a single RJV. In this case we can restrict the
analysis to two firms as the extension to is conceptually straightforward
and notation-wise cumbersome. In the last section, a brief example will be
provided of a partial RJV (i.e., when a proper subset of firms join a RJV, while
others remain independent) showing that the qualitative results obtained in the
case of industry-wide RJVs are likely to apply more generally.
5 Independent firms vs organization-efficient
RJVs
In order to obtain a given innovation any given firm has to complete T research
tasks, and w.l.o.g. we can assume that each firm can try only one method for
each of the T tasks, each of which has a probability of success p. Thus the
probability of overall success for an independent firm is and its expected
gross profit is given by:
. [4]
i.e., for an independent firm, its expected gross profit is a weighted average of all
possible profits, starting with monopoly profits ( ) when all other competitors
fail and ending with the lowest profits ( ), when all its competitors also succeed.
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Expected gross profit for a member of an N-firm organization-efficient RJV is
given by:
. [5]
i.e., provided the organization-efficient RJV succeeds (which happens with prob-
ability ), all RJV members will compete in the final output market and
collect the lowest possible profits .
I examine first the case of a tournament model, which turns out to yield a
strong unambiguous result:
Proposition 1. For , if firms compete for a single prize, membership of
an organization-efficient RJV is always more profitable than independent research.
Proof:
Expected gross profits for an independent firm are given by:
[6]
which can be rearranged as:
. [7]
The proposition follows from Theorem 1:
RJV1 (1 ) 1 (1 )I MM
TT N NG p p G
N N
. [8]
Proposition 1 is remarkably general, as it holds for any maximization program
that guarantees a unique Nash equilibrium for independent firms (recall that in
the above computations ( , )I I ip p x x , where
Ix the equilibrium investment in
R&D by independent firms), and for any multi-task ( 2T ) research project and
for any number of firms 2N .
It is interesting to see why the above inequality holds. The first term of the
per-firm gross profit from independent research, [1 (1 ) ]T Np , turns out to be the
overall probability of success that would be achieved by a RJV if it was orga-
nized inefficiently, i.e., if each of N teams tackled all T tasks. In other words,
Proposition 1 establishes that for a single-prize tournament the payoff for an
individual firm carrying out independent research is the same as for a member
of a N-firm RJV organized inefficiently.
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In the Appendix a simple example shows how the superiority of an efficiently-
organizedRJVextends to themoregeneral asymmetric case (when theprobabilities of
success vary across tasks) and amore generalmodel of information flows is provided
that generates independent research and fully efficient RJVs as special cases.
In the non-tournament case, two opposing forces are at work. On the one
hand, the greater probability of overall success under an organization-efficient
RJV established for the tournament model still holds. On the other hand, in the
non-tournament scenario the gross profit earned by each member of the RJV
could be so small as to nullify the RJV’s organizational advantage. To take an
extreme example, suppose that for 2, NN (as would be the case in a
constant-marginal cost homogeneous-good Bertrand oligopoly). Then no RJV
could break even. Given that no unambiguous results like Proposition 1 can be
established for the non-tournament case, it is more revealing to focus on specific
examples that bring out the tension between these two opposing forces.
I consider first the two-firm case. Expected gross profits for independent
firms and for members of the organization-efficient RJV are given by:
2
(1 )I T T T MMG p p p [9]
RJV
2
(2 )T T MG p p [10]
Proposition 2. If two firms compete for a monopoly prize πM and a duopoly
prize
2
M
, then membership of an organization-efficient RJV is more profitable
than independent research for all values of T, p, and α2 such that
2
(2 )
1
T T
T
p p
p
. [11]
Figure 2 shows the range of 2( , )p values for 2,3T such that the RJV dom-
inates independent research (recall that 2 2, otherwise duopoly profits would
exceed monopoly profits!).
Recall that for a constant-marginal cost linear Cournot oligopoly, 2 2.25,
so that an efficiently-organized RJV is more profitable than independent
research for 7
9
p in the two-task case, 0.888p in the three-task case, etc.
It is simple to show that the superiority of RJVs increases with the complex-
ity of research (i.e. with the number of tasks T)13 and with the difficulty of
individual tasks (i.e., with (1 )p (1 )p ).
13
(2 )
1 0
T T
T
p pd
p
dT
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To complete the two-firm case we may consider a different stochastic
process, namely, the scenario where for each task only one out of M possible
methods yields success, with the remaining 1M being “dry holes”. If two tasks
have to be completed, the probability of overall success for an independent firm
and for a member of the organization-efficient RJV are given respectively by
1
M
T
and 2
T
M
. The reason why in this case an RJV is 2T times more likely than
an independent firm to succeed in completing all T tasks is that this case
provides an extreme example of an intrinsic advantage of RJVs that is ignored
elsewhere in the paper, namely, RJVs can co-ordinate the type of solutions being
attempted to solve each task and thus avoid the possible duplication of efforts
that occurs under independent, unco-ordinated research. Substituting the above
probabilities in eq. [11] we obtain:
Proposition 2’. If two firms compete for a monopoly prize πM and a duopoly prize
2
M
, then membership of an organization-efficient RJV using two out of M possible
methods per task is more profitable than independent research for all values of T,
M, and α2 such that
2
12
11
T
T
T
M
M
. [11’]
Figure 2: When is a 2-firm RJV superior to independent research?
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As it can be seen from Figure 3, where the shaded areas indicate the values
of M and 2 that satisfy condition eq. [11’] for 2,3T , organizational advantage
of the RJV far outweighs the competitive disadvantage of foregoing the prospect
of earning very large monopoly profits (compared to duopoly profits).
Even though the full analysis of the case of 2N firms is a matter for future
research, the following section suggests that the organizational superiority of
RJVs is not confined to the two-firm case.
6 Full and partial RJVs in a cournot triopoly
The expected gross profits per firm under independent research in a 3-firm linear
Cournot oligopoly with T research tasks are given by:
22 4 1(1 ) 2(1 ) ( )
9 4
I T T T T T
MMMG p p p p p [12]
whereas eachmember of the 3-firm organization efficient RJV earns gross profits of:
RJV 3 11 (1 )
4M
T
G p [13]
Solving the polynomial RJV( ) ( )IG p G p shows that in the linear Cournot triopoly
case the organization-efficient full RJV (when all three firms join) is more
Figure 3: When is a 2-firm RJV superior to independent research (with minor research
coordination)?
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profitable than independent research for any value of p less than a critical
cut-off p = 0.397 (for T = 2), p = 0.6 (T = 3), p = 0.69 (T = 4) (Figure 4).
Of course, for N > 2 we have to consider the case of partial RJVs, i.e.,
research collaboration between fewer than the total number of firms in the
industry. In the case of a triopoly this means introducing two additional gross
profit functions, the per-member gross profits for a 2-firm RJV:
2 firmRJV 2 4 11 (1 ) (1 )
9 4
T T
M M
T
G p p p [14]
and the gross profits of the “solitary” firm excluded from the RJV:
22 11 1 (1 ) 1 1
4
TTS T
MMG p p p [15]
This simple example enables us to establish that a partial RJV may not be a
stable configuration, i.e., it is not coalition-proof.
For a partial RJV not to be coalition-proof, two conditions must hold: (i) the
excluded firm must find profitable bribing each member of the 2-firm RJV, and (ii)
each member of the 2-firm RJV must be better off by accepting the bribe b2, i.e.,
(i) 3 firmRJV sG b G and [16]
(ii) 3 firmRJV 2 firmRJV
2
bG G , i.e., [17]
3 firmRJV 2 firmRJV3 2 SG G G [18]
Figure 4: When is a 3-firm RJV superior to independent research?
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Solving the relevant polynomial shows that inequality eq. [18] holds for all p
less than a critical cut-off 0.444p (for T = 2), 0.636p (for T = 3), and
0.715p (for T = 4). It follows that, as p p, the unique coalition-proof config-
uration is either a full (3-firm) RJV (for p p) or independent research by all
three firms (for p p).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, research joint ventures not only have been stripped of all the
potential advantages highlighted in the literature, e.g., avoidance of duplication,
possibility to co-ordinate research activities, etc., but most acutely of all have
been prevented, by design, from allocating resources to R&D efforts in an
optimizing way. In spite of these crippling handicaps, it has been shown that
for a very wide range of market structures (summarized by the αi parameters)
RJVs can be more profitable and yields higher levels of net expected social
welfare than independent research, provided they choose the most efficient
organization of resources.
The simple model sketched in this paper can be extended in various direc-
tions, but I shall mention just two. First, in a richer model RJVs should optimize
over both the allocation and the organization of R&D resources. This is unlikely
to be a purely “additive” process, because the optimal organization of research
may interact in non-obvious ways with optimization over resource allocation.
Second, the organizational aspects of RJVs can be extended to cover research
design: for example, an RJV can select a method to solve a particular task with a
lower probability of success than an alternative method, if the former is more
“generic”, i.e., more likely to be combined successfully with solutions to other
tasks. The development of the theory of fully optimizing RJVs appears to be both
feasible and rich with valuable insights.
Appendix
A1 Proof of Theorem 1
The basic result that a series of parallel arrangements of components is more
likely to succeed than a parallel arrangement of series of components has a
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status akin to the Folk Theorem in game theory and is similarly tricky to pin
down to a definite source. Perhaps the simplest version can be found in Ross
(1996, Theorem 9.1) which can be adapted to prove Theorem 1 in the paper as
follows:
Theorem 1 (after Ross (1996)):
For any 1 0p , smaetsmaet ( ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) ( )
T NNTNT p p p p .
The above theorem is both a special case and a trivial extension of Theorem 9.1
in Ross (1996).
For any Sð_Þ and T-dimensional vectors p, p’:
1 [1 ( )][1 ( )]ss− − −p p' , where ( )s p is the probability that a series of T components
with individual probability of success p succeeds.
Theorem 1 follows from the above by setting p p and by iterating Theorem
9.1 N times (and not just twice as in Theorem 9.1).
A2 The bridge structure as a general model of information
flows
Consider the “bridge” structure depicted earlier in Figure 1 and assume that the
probabilities of individual task success for firms A and B are respectively Ap and
Bp , as in Figure 5. Moreover, for reasons that will become apparent shortly,
introduce a “connecting” unit that succeeds with probability .
Figure 5: The bridge structure and information flows.
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It is straightforward to compute the overall probability of success of the
“bridge” structure, ( , , )B A Bp p , as:
2222
2 2 2 2
( , , ) 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )
A B A B A B B B A A
A B A B A A B B
p p p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
[19]
Notice that under symmetry ( A Bp p p) eq. [19] simplifies to:
2 2 2( , ) 2 2 (1 )p p p p [20]
Equation [20] shows that the “bridge” structure encompasses both types of RJV
organizations (inefficient, with N teams; efficient, with T teams) as special cases:
2 2( ,0) 2 smaetNB p p p [21]
2 2 teams( ,1) (2 ) TB p p p [22]
This observation is interesting for three reasons: (i) the organization-efficient
RJV, by assigning a team to each task, effectively introduces additional informa-
tion flows across tasks, which explains why it dominates the alternative arrange-
ment (assigning each team to the full series of tasks); (ii) even when inter-task
information flows are imperfect (i.e., ), organization-efficient RJVs are
more likely to achieve overall success than independent firms; (iii) the super-
iority of efficient RJVs may hold also in the case (not examined in this paper)
when the probabilities of individual success are not statistically independent.
Using eq. [19] we can get an insight into the quantitative superiority of RJVs
compared to independent research. Recalling that in a tournament model the
profits from independent research are the same as from membership of an
inefficient RJV, we can compute the rate of return from forming an efficient
RJV as:
. [23]
Figure 6 shows that, for the relevant case when success in individual tasks is
“difficult” (i.e., ), this rate of return ranges from nearly 100% to 10%:
The formulation of the alternative organizational structures open to an RJV
in terms of the “bridge structure” provides a simple way of comparing the results
in this paper with the vast literature on RJVs spawned by d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). A distinctive feature of this literature
is to regard the formation of an RJV as a means of endogenizing any spillover
Multi-task Research 17
effect. For single-task research, this effectively amounts to assuming that any
RJV member agrees to share its successful innovation with all other members.
Under multi-task research there is a richer network of potential information
flows, some of which can be formalized by means of our bridge structure. The
canonical RJV model, where members share information about completed pro-
jects is captured by setting in eq. [19], whereas an organizationally-efficient
RJV would share information about completed tasks, i.e., would set . Notice
also that the bridge structure can be used to model the case where different
research tasks undertaken by different RJV members may not be fully compa-
tible, i.e., success in task i by member A when combined with success in task j
by member B leads to the whole project succeeding with probability .
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